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Banal nationalism, postmodernism and capitalism:  Revisiting Billig's critique of Rorty. 
Stephen Gibson (York St John University) 
 
Introduction 
Michael Billig’s ‘Nationalism and Richard Rorty: The text as a flag for Pax 
Americana’, published in New Left Review in 1993, will be familiar to most readers as the 
final substantive chapter in Banal Nationalism (Billig 1995a), in which it was re-titled, 
‘Philosophy as a flag for the Pax Americana’. Indeed, the arguments presented in the New 
Left Review article are inseparable from the broader banal nationalism thesis, and their 
influence can only be understood in this context. In the present chapter, my focus will thus be 
on the version of the critical engagement with Rorty presented in Banal Nationalism, rather 
than in New Left Review. There is a further advantage to this focus, and one that will become 
apparent as my argument develops. The modifications that Billig made to the argument 
presented in Banal nationalism included a discussion of a then-recent New York Times article 
by Rorty (1994), published after Billig’s (1993) article in New Left Review. Rorty’s (1994) 
article is significant in marking a shift on his part towards a more explicit engagement with 
themes of patriotism and national pride than had previously been the case, and I will suggest 
that this can be seen as a precursor to his subsequent development of his ideas on these 
themes in his later volume Achieving our Country (Rorty 1998). 
 In what follows, I will begin by outlining the general thesis of Banal Nationalism and 
some critical reactions to it, before moving on to spend the majority of the chapter 
considering Billig’s specific critique of Rorty, and Rorty’s development of a more explicit set 
of arguments concerning national pride in Achieving our Country. It will be shown that 
Rorty’s celebration of national pride is accompanied by an acceptance of capitalism as 
essentially inevitable, or at least as being something that is beyond ‘realistic’ challenge. In 
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this respect, Billig’s argument concerning the banality of the world of nations can be 
extended to encompass the banal acceptance of the world of capital. I will subsequently link 
some of these ideas to Billig’s (2012, 2013) more recent writing in which he has addressed 
what has been termed ‘academic capitalism’ – the acceptance of market values into the 
academy. More broadly, I will suggest that engagement with ideological themes such as these 
constitute an important current in an expanded discursive psychology. Billig’s recent work 
has identified a trend towards a narrowing of focus in academia, and if there is a wider lesson 
for discursive psychology to be drawn from his critique of Rorty – as from so much of 
Billig’s work – it is that it would benefit from a broadening of purview, rather than an 
increasing narrowness in its focus. 
 
Banal Nationalism 
Billig’s (1995a) central contention in Banal Nationalism was that social scientists 
have concentrated on the periodic outbursts of nationalism (‘hot’ nationalism), and have 
neglected the more routine, taken-for-granted nationalism that reproduces extant nation-states 
and the broader world-of-nations as natural and inevitable (‘banal’ nationalism). Billig traced 
the operation of banal nationalism in a number of directions, identifying the way in which a 
distinction can be drawn between patriotism and nationalism such that ‘our’ national 
sentiment can be construed as a healthy patriotic spirit, whereas the national sentiment of 
others can be treated as dangerous nationalism. Billig notes how national flags hanging 
limply from public buildings are typically not consciously noticed by people going about 
their daily business, but that these flags nevertheless work as an implicit reminder of the 
nation. Billig uses the idea of ‘flagging’ as a metaphor for other occasions when banal 
reminders of nationhood are served in the course of everyday life. Because these reminders 
are not consciously noticed, however, the reminding is not experienced as a reminding. In 
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this respect, banal nationalism involves a complex dynamic of remembering and forgetting. 
The constant flagging ensures that we remember our status as nationals, and the place of ‘our’ 
nation in the world of nations, but this remembering is itself forgotten, leaving the impression 
that nations are natural and inevitable features of the world. A particularly important form of 
flagging is in the use of deixical referents – ‘little words’ such as we, us, them, our , here – 
which can be used to tacitly flag the nation as the relevant frame for discussion of some issue, 
event or phenomena. Billig demonstrated the presence of such deixical referents across a 
number of contexts, and notably undertook an exploratory ‘day survey’ of British ‘national’ 
newspapers to highlight the extent to which banal nationalist assumptions were built into 
their content and structure. For example, Billig noted how references to the weather or the 
economy typically assume a national frame without explicitly specifying it as such. 
 In outlining this thesis, Billig was concerned with the specificities of nationhood. In 
drawing attention to the shortcomings of general social psychological theories of identity, 
Billig stressed that ‘the historical particularities of nationalism, and its links with the world of 
nation-states, tend to be overlooked, if national ‘identity’ is considered as functionally 
equivalent with any other type of ‘identity’ (1995a: 65; see also Billig 1996). This echoed 
concerns raised some years previously by Tajfel (1970), who criticised the triviality of 
theories which seek only generality for its own sake. According to Tajfel, ‘[i]t is this triviality 
that presents perhaps the most intractable problem for the “universal” theories: when dealing 
with concrete cultural or social reality, they explain very little and predict nothing’ (1970: 
122). Moreover, Tajfel (1960: 846), argued that a social psychology of nationalism needed to 
be able to account for why ‘[w]e do not expect a doctor to be ready to die for the British 
Medical Association; but we are not surprised if someone says: “I am willing to die for my 
country”.’ This concern to account for the extent to which nationalism has constituted the 
legitimating ideology behind countless deaths is clearly present from the outset of Banal 
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Nationalism, the opening line of which reads, ‘All societies that maintain armies maintain the 
belief that some things are more valuable than life itself’ (1995a: 1). For Billig, then, as for 
Tajfel before him, nationalism is a topic worthy of social psychological attention in its own 
right. 
 
Critical reaction to Banal Nationalism 
Banal nationalism has been hugely influential across the social sciences. As Skey 
(2009: 333) has noted, it ‘led the way in marking something of a shift in focus as research 
began to move away from the more macro-scale theorising on nationalism to more empirical-
based studies, that focused on issues of representation, contestation and localised meaning-
making as well as more contextualized case studies.’ It is in this respect that Banal 
Nationalism can be understood as applying the spirit of the social scientific ‘turn to language’ 
to the subject of nationalism. 
There is insufficient space in a single chapter to review all the reactions to, and 
extensions of, Billig’s thesis, and as such my focus here will, of necessity, be highly 
selective. I will focus in particular on two criticisms: first, that Billig underestimated the role 
of contestation; and second, that Billig overstated the extent to which certain entities might be 
said to be ‘national’. 
 
Contestation 
Reicher, Hopkins and Condor (1997) eched Billig’s (1995a) call for a focus on the 
specificity of national categories, but suggested that taken-for-granted status is not something 
specific to nations. Other categories, such as ‘race’, can be understood in similar terms. If 
banality is therefore not a distinguishing feature of nationalism per se, then ‘it is necessary to 
consider when and why our everyday concerns are structured in national rather than other 
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terms’ (Reicher et al. 1997: 77). Reicher et al. argued that this poses particular problems for 
Billig’s approach: 
His analysis concerns the way in which people are textually addressed in ways that 
presuppose a national dimension, but the question of how text relates to understanding 
and action is not spelt out. Is it that people are simply interpellated in an Althusserian 
sense? [footnote omitted] This would seem unlikely, since elsewhere (for instance in 
Arguing and Thinking) Billig is concerned to challenge the notion of human beings as 
automatons and to accord people agency. Nonetheless, in the absence of an explicit 
position to the contrary, Billig can be seen as eliding media texts with human 
consciousness. 
(Reicher et al. 1997: 77-8) 
This anticipates criticisms made elsewhere (e.g. Skey 2009; Reicher & Hopkins 2001), that 
Billig underestimated the role of contestation in relation to nationalism. As Reicher et al. 
note, this is all the more striking given Billig’s (1987, 1991; Billig et al. 1988) development 
of a theoretical perspective which places rhetoric at the heart of social and psychological life.  
However, in a discussion of the contributions that might be made by rhetorical psychology to 
the study of social movements, Billig (1995b) did make it clear that the banal acceptance of 
the world of nations was not something that should be taken to imply that counter-argument 
was impossible. In drawing attention to the importance of exploring not only that which is the 
subject for explicit argumentation, he also drew attention to silencing, suggesting that despite 
nationhood presently being seen ‘to be as natural as rivers and mountain ranges’, alternatives 
are possible: ‘As sleeping monsters within today’s thoughts, they wait to be freshly awakened 
by a social movement of the future’ (Billig 1995b: 80). More recently, Billig (2009) has 
responded to this criticism by developing more explicitly the extent to which Banal 
Nationalism should be understood in conjunction with his earlier work. Moreover, his 
6 
 
subsequent work – particularly his re-casting of Freudian repression as a fundamentally 
rhetorical act (Billig 1999) – addresses the issue of how, precisely, the same rhetorical 
perspective can be used to explore that which is left unsaid as much as it can be used to 
explore that which is the subject of overt argumentation. 
 
The status of the ‘national’ 
 Rather than being an end-point of analysis, Billig (1995a: 175) emphasised that 
‘There is much systematic, empirical work to be done.’ Subsequent research has indeed 
begun to expand on Billig’s initial analysis, and in this respect one of the most striking 
modifications to the banal nationalism thesis concerns the status of those entities presumed to 
be ‘national’. 
In a series of papers, Rosie, MacInnes, Petersoo, Condor and Kennedy (2004; 
MacInnes et al. 2007; Rosie et al. 2006; see also Skey 2009) have argued that Billig’s 
relatively straightforward assertion of the existence of a British ‘national’ press is 
problematic in the face of the variety of media within a state such as the United Kingdom. 
For example, most ‘national’ newspapers published in London have separate editions for 
Scotland featuring some modification in content. Similarly, some newspapers aimed at a 
Scottish readership position themselves specifically as Scottish national newspapers, and 
even apparently self-evidently regional newspapers can on occasion adopt the language of 
nationhood, such as the Yorkshire Post, which describes itself as ‘Yorkshire’s national 
newspaper’ (MacInnes et al. 2007). In a slightly different vein, the extent to which readers 
may conceive of their location in the world in purely national terms can be questioned:  ‘We 
do not know how far they imagine themselves as members of a community of ‘English’. 
‘Scottish’ or ‘British’ readers, nor whether they see the latter as national’ (Rosie et al. 2004: 
454-5). 
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 In responding to these critiques, Billig (2009) has acknowledged that his initial day 
survey oversimplified the ‘national’ dynamics of the UK. But this issue may extend beyond 
the ‘national’ press. The work of Condor and her colleagues (e.g. Abell, Condor & Stevenson 
2006; Condor 1996, 2000, 2006, 2011; Condor & Abell 2006) on the ways in which ordinary 
people in England and Scotland understand themselves (or not) in ‘national’ terms has 
highlighted the utility of conceiving of both the banality of ‘national’ referents, and the very 
status of these referents as ‘national’, as being social accomplishments, ‘the outcome of a 
socially distributed process of meaning-construction’ (Condor 2000: 199-200). In this 
respect, Condor points to the importance of contextualising any study of banal nationalism in 
a close analysis of participant understandings of the entities to which they refer. Thus, 
analysts are enjoined to be cautious about imposing ‘nationalised’ readings of deixical 
referents just because these seem most appropriate to the analyst, and to be cautious about 
attributing ‘national’ status to an entity, such as ‘Britain’, when it is not immediately apparent 
that participants themselves share that understanding. 
 Condor’s work represents the most detailed and systematic attempt to study the 
‘national’ commonsense of ordinary social actors, and in this respect the context of the UK 
has provided a particularly fruitful setting for the expansion of Billig’s original thesis. Yet 
Billig (2009) has recently noted that little further work has scrutinized the nationalism of the 
USA, which took such a central role in his initial formulation of banal nationalism. Arguably, 
it is in his critique of Rorty that Billig outlines the particular problems of US nationalism 
most fully. The next section of the present chapter will thus be concerned with re-visiting 
Billig’s critique of Rorty, and extending it in light of Rorty’s subsequent volume, Achieving 
our Country.  
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Billig’s critique of Rorty 
Thus far, I have neglected one important aspect of the banal nationalism thesis. Billig 
(1995a) was not concerned simply to identify banal nationalism in the everyday lives of 
ordinary social actors, the speeches of political leaders and the pages of ‘national’ 
newspapers; at the heart of Billig’s thesis was the banal nationalism of academic theories 
themselves. Banal Nationalism appeared at a time when many theorists were suggesting that 
nationalism was a declining force. Billig challenged such arguments, and showed how they 
often implicitly took for granted the world of nations. He drew attention to the ways in which 
banal nationalist assumptions can be identified in the work of several influential scholars, and 
took particular issue with postmodern approaches which pointed to the emergence of a more 
fluid ‘identity politics’ at the expense of national identities. Most notably in this respect, his 
critique of Rorty challenged one of the doyens of postmodern philosophy. The positioning of 
this critique as the final chapter of Banal Nationalism is thus significant. Placing Pax in the 
context of the broader thesis of banal nationalism enables an appreciation of its status as a 
culmination of the arguments developed in the book. 
Billig (1995a: 157) cited Terry Eagleton’s damning indictment of Rorty’s philosophy 
as suggesting a world in which ‘the intellectuals will be ‘ironists’, practising a suitably 
cavalier, laid-back attitude to their beliefs, while the masses … will continue to salute the flag 
and take life seriously’. Billig took issue with this description, suggesting that flag-waving 
can be found in Rorty’s work, and indeed he goes on to discuss a then recent article in the 
New York Times in which Rorty (1994) explicitly advocated the need for greater patriotism. 
Moreover, Billig subsequently traced the links between Rorty’s call for (US) patriotism and 
his formal philosophical writings. 
Billig noted that the first person plural (we, us, our) takes centre-stage in Rorty’s 
philosophy. Rorty’s rejection of universal conceptions of morality leads him to locate the 
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appropriate grounding for moral judgements in the somewhat vague notion of the 
community: “the core meaning of ‘immoral action’ is ‘the sort of thing that we don’t do’” 
(Rorty, cited in Billig, 1995a: 162; emphasis in [Rorty’s] original). 
In outlining Rorty’s advocacy of a limited form of ethnocentrism, Billig draws 
attention to the implicit universality of Rorty’s claims – in effect, humans are inevitably 
ethnocentric, but we have a choice concerning the form that this ethnocentrism takes. Billig 
shows how Rorty’s ‘admitted ethnocentrism (which simultaneously is a subtly denied 
ethnocentrism) enables ‘us’ to praise ‘ourselves’, and to condemn ‘others’. Given that ‘we’ 
all have to be ethnocentric, then ‘we’ are the best of ethnocentrics’ (Billig 1995a: 164). As 
Billig puts it, Rorty’s position boils down to the assertion that, ‘‘We’ can be proud of 
‘ourselves’, because ‘we’ are not the sort of people to be proud of ‘ourselves’’ (165). But 
precisely who ‘we’ are in Rorty’s texts varies widely, and is sometimes left completely 
unspecified. 
Drawing on ideas discussed in previous chapters of Banal Nationalism, Billig argues 
that attention to deixical referents can be particularly illuminating as they are frequently used 
for ‘presenting sectional interests as if they were universal ones’ (1995a: 166). Billig refers to 
this as the syntax of hegemony – the way in which the objectives of the powerful can be 
elided with those of collectives of which an individual speaker or writer claims membership. 
Often, Rorty construes the ‘we’ to whom ‘we’ should be loyal as ‘our’ society. However, 
Billig notes that – as is the case with many other philosophers and social scientists – Rorty 
tends to neglect the extent to which ‘society’ is typically used to mean nation-state. In doing 
so, Rorty advocates the virtues of a liberal or progressive view of ‘society’, and indeed in 
advocating the location of morality in ‘our society’ Rorty is thereby according the nation-
state a particularly central role in his philosophy. 
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Crucially, however, the story does not end there. The tendency towards universalism 
in Rorty’s writings means that the liberal view of ‘society’ is not simply conceived as one 
amongst many, but as a view that others are exhorted to share. The vaguely bounded ‘we’ 
gives way to broader ‘we’s as Rorty recommends this position to all , seeing ‘the history of 
humanity … as the gradual spread of certain virtues typical to the democratic West’ (Rorty, 
cited in Billig 1995a: 172). 
 
Achieving our country: From banal nationalism to enthusiastic flag-waving 
As Billig observes, ‘There is one identity largely absent in Rorty’s philosophical 
‘we’s, but hugely foregrounded in his New York Times article: a national identity’ (Billig 
1995a: 167). It thus requires a detailed and scholarly analysis by Billig to draw out the banal 
assumptions of Rorty’s texts. However, it appears that the New York Times article was not 
simply an anomaly, but was something of a foreshadowing of what was to come. Shortly 
after the publication of Banal Nationalism, Rorty (1998) expanded on his call for US 
patriotism in his brief volume Achieving our Country. Even a cursory examination of 
Achieving our Country suggests that by this point, Rorty had not only begun to notice the 
unwaved flags, but to wave them fervently himself. In contrast to the texts scrutinized by 
Billig, references to ‘we Americans’ (e.g. 1998: 13, 22, 28, 48, 91, 97, 106) are not 
infrequent, and there is a clear and unambiguous defence of the virtues of national pride from 
the outset. Achieving our Country does not, therefore, require the same forensic level of 
scholarly analysis to unpack the nationalist assumptions at its heart – these are now 
foregrounded. However, the particular arguments that Rorty advances are worthy of closer 
scrutiny for they reveal interesting further assumptions about the nature of nations, 
nationalism and national pride. Moreover, in this extended exposition of his views on 
national pride, Rorty engages in detailed critique of leftist intellectuals who he holds 
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responsible for a decline in the acceptability of US national pride. When we consider these 
arguments, the central place of capitalism in Rorty’s injunction to national pride is 
unmistakable. This allows us to draw out one frequently neglected aspect of the banal 
nationalism thesis: the specifically US form of banal nationalism that so concerned Billig is 
inextricably bound up with a related set of banal assumptions about the inevitability of 
capitalism. Such assumptions can be identified in a range of settings, including – as Billig has 
himself pointed out recently – in academia. 
 
Rorty and capitalism 
The anti-Marxist position articulated in the New York Times article analysed by Billig 
is extended in Achieving our Country. In developing the distinction between the reformist left 
and the new left, Rorty argues that: 
‘For us Americans, it is important not to let Marxism influence the story we tell about 
our own Left. We should repudiate the Marxists’ insinuation that only those who are 
convinced capitalism must be overthrown can count as leftists, and that everybody 
else is a wimpy liberal, a self-deceiving bourgeois reformer’ (Rorty 1998: 42). 
This is striking insofar as Rorty is not simply arguing against Marxism, or explaining that 
Marxism was wrong. He is arguing that it is important ‘for us Americans’ not to be 
influenced by Marxism. As ever with such formulations, it is possible to ask what this implies 
for those who are not ‘us’. Presumably, it is less important for an unspecified ‘them’ who are 
not ‘us’ to be influenced by Marxism. Quite simply, this echoes a long-standing political, 
academic and popular tradition which construes Marxism as ‘un-American’. 
Rorty’s national pride is, in an important sense, tied to his commitment to pragmatism 
– he acknowledges at the outset of Achieving our Country that the ultimate goal should 
indeed be a post-nation-state world, but suggests that such a world is simply not presently 
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feasible. Arguing for the necessity of emotional involvement in one’s country, he suggests 
that: 
The need for this sort of involvement remains even for those who, like myself, hope 
that the United States of America will someday yield up sovereignty to what 
Tennyson called “the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World.” For such a 
federation will never come into existence unless the governments of the individual 
nation-states cooperate in setting it up, and unless the citizens of those nation-states 
take a certain amount of pride (even rueful and hesitant pride) in their governments’ 
efforts to do so. 
(Rorty 1998: 3) 
He nevertheless goes on to criticise those on what he terms ‘the cultural Left’ who have 
become deeply suspicious of American national pride, suggesting that ‘The current leftist 
habit of taking the long view and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless 
as was faith in Marx’s philosophy of history’ (Rorty 1998: 98). Rorty is particularly critical 
of what he sees as a preoccupation with philosophizing and theorizing, suggesting that much 
of what passes for the intellectual left consists of debates so abstracted from everyday 
concerns as to be of no practical use in achieving political change. And yet when Rorty 
explains why, despite the myriad imperfections of America, the nation-state represents the 
best available option for political progress, things get even more curious: 
We were supposed to love our country because it showed promise of being kinder and 
more generous than other countries. As the blacks and gays, among others, were well 
aware, this was a counsel of perfection rather than description of fact. But you cannot 
urge national political renewal on the basis of descriptions of fact. You have to 
describe the country in terms of what you passionately hope it will become, as well as 
in terms of what you know it to be now. You have to be loyal to a dream country 
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rather than to the one to which you wake up every morning. Unless such loyalty 
exists, the ideal has no chance of becoming actual. 
(Rorty 1998: 101) 
There is thus a distinction between the hopes of those who recognise the problems of 
America and hope to ‘achieve our country’, and those who recognise the same problems but 
hope to achieve a post-national world. The former – including Rorty – are to be commended 
for sensibly engaging in the realm of practical politics, while the latter are to be castigated for 
an idealistic refusal to live in the real world. But why? Rorty points to the present inability to 
imagine alternatives to the world of nation-states, and links this explicitly to an inability to 
imagine alternatives to capitalism. The cultural Left, according to Rorty (1998: 102), has 
adopted ‘ideals which nobody is yet able to imagine being actualized’, not least amongst 
which is ‘the end of capitalism’ (ibid.). Rorty is scathing of the inability of the cultural Left to 
offer concrete alternatives (‘what this new thing will be, nobody knows’; 1998: 103), arguing 
that the ‘insouciant use of terms like “late capitalism” suggests that we can just wait for 
capitalism to collapse, rather than figuring out what, in the absence of markets, will set prices 
and regulate distribution’ (103-4). In the absence of a proper alternative to capitalism, Rorty’s 
advice is that: 
the Left should get back into the business of piecemeal reform within the framework 
of a market economy. … Someday, perhaps, cumulative piecemeal reform will be 
found to have brought about revolutionary change. Such reforms might someday 
produce a presently unimaginable nonmarket economy, and much more widely 
distributed powers of decisionmaking. They might also, given similar reforms in other 
countries, bring about an international federation, a world government. … But in the 
meantime, we should not let the abstractly described best be the enemy of the better. 
We should not let speculation about a totally changed system, and a totally different 
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way of thinking about human life and human affairs, replace step-by-step reform of 
the system we presently have. 
(Rorty 1998: 105) 
This is a classically pragmatist position, pointing to the dangers of grand theory and abstract 
philosophy, and arguing that we should work within the here and now. The appeal of such 
arguments can be understood in part as a function of their status as a rhetorical bottom-line: 
get real, says the pragmatist, we’d all like a better world, but we have to work with what 
we’ve got. In this respect, we have the arch anti-foundationalist resorting to a realist line of 
argument in order to argue for the Left to work within the status quo – a status quo which 
takes for granted American national pride and capitalism even as it maintains an abstract 
commitment to – at some unspecified point in the future – replacing them with something 
better. But this unspecified commitment – the vague hope that piecemeal reform might lead 
to a nonmarket economy in a post-national world – is no more clearly articulated than in the 
doctrines of the cultural Left dismissed by Rorty. And here’s the rub: Rorty’s pragmatic 
philosophy is essentially a philosophy of defeat – a philosophy (or perhaps that should be an 
anti-philosophy) which accepts that the hopes of a genuinely radical alternative to the 
capitalist doctrine enshrined in the contemporary USA are misplaced. 
 Such arguments begin to move us some distance from contemporary discursive 
psychology as typically understood. For many discursive psychologists, engagement with 
broad ideological themes takes second place to the close analysis of talk and text. Yet it is not 
to deny the value of the latter to suggest that the former should retain its place at the heart of 
any discursive psychology. At the present time, the dangers of neglecting ideology are 
particularly notable for critical scholars, and in this respect it is worth considering the links 
between banal nationalism, discursive psychology and the bizarre capitalistic logic currently 
to be found at the heart of academic life. 
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Academic capitalism and discursive psychology 
Rorty’s exhortation to leftists to ‘get real’ and work within capitalism is in itself 
hardly novel – it is a familiar refrain these days as the business model and its associated creed 
of managerialism finds its way into more and more corners of social and economic life which 
might once have been seen as necessitating a quite different form of organization. As has 
been widely debated in recent times, one such area is academia itself. In some of his recent 
writings, Billig has drawn attention to the pernicious effects of academic capitalism, and in 
reflecting on the conditions which gave rise to his seminal Arguing and thinking, has 
discussed the political climate in which it was written: 
Arguing and thinking was written when an ideologically driven, right-wing 
Conservative government was explicitly seeking to control British universities under 
its free-market economic policies, imposing its philosophy of academic capitalism on 
higher education. The government’s message was that if the universities wished to 
compete for public funds then they would have to demonstrate their economic 
usefulness; if not, the weak would fall by the wayside. Learning was not to be valued 
for its own sake, but if anything had value it should be seen to be useful, especially 
economically useful. Usefulness could, in their philosophy, be economically 
computed. To reject computational models of the mind, which viewed humans as 
machines, and ‘to make antiquarian play’ was, according to the author, ‘to show the 
old Protagorean “spirit of contradiction”’ (Billig, 1987, p. 8). Thus, in wandering 
about the library reading all but forgotten texts from the past, the author was 
deliberately turning his back on the politically driven demands of the present. 
(Billig 2012: 418) 
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For Rorty, no doubt such an approach would be foolish in the extreme. Rejecting academic 
convention in order to make a political point would beg the question, ‘but what has this 
rejection achieved?’ Despite Billig’s own modesty concerning his work, it would not be 
difficult to point to a number of ‘objective’ indicators of its success: citation counts, 
academic awards, keynote presentations, and indeed the selection of Billig’s work for 
comment and discussion in volumes such as the present one and Antaki and Condor’s (2014) 
recent festschrift. But to do this unthinkingly, as a matter of course, as the way that one 
demonstrates academic ‘impact’ these days, is to accept the rules of the game as defined 
within precisely those ideologies which we seek to challenge (Billig, 2013). Of course, the 
vast majority of academics have to play by these rules to a certain extent to remain in gainful 
employment – and it would be disingenuous of me to suggest that I didn’t engage in these 
language games myself when the occasion demandedi – but if we allow ourselves to come to 
believe that this is anything other than a game designed by those who would re-model 
academia according to the business approach, we are in danger of forgetting what academia 
should be. As Reicher (2011: 394) has argued, ‘The whole point of Universities is to 
encourage a long-term perspective. It is to do what private enterprise militates against, which 
is to look beyond the immediate future (where estimates of gain and loss can be made and 
reasonable investment risks can be entertained) and start on interesting paths without 
knowing where they might ultimately lead.’ 
As Billig (2012) notes, the pressures on academics in the present political climate are 
towards unthinking and uncritical action. In the United Kingdom, the requirement to 
demonstrate the ‘impact’ of one’s work beyond the academy has recently been elevated to a 
key position in decision making processes for the allocation of public funds for academic 
research. Such an approach encourages short-termism with research increasingly oriented 
towards producing small-scale ‘impact’ in the very near future, without challenging broader 
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systems, tending to take priority. This makes the production of genuinely original and path-
breaking work much less likely. As Reicher (2011: 394) has argued, ‘Such achievements 
might be rare, but an academic culture that makes them impossible (or even harder) is 
ultimately self-defeating’. Moreover, ‘nationalist’ii assumptions lie at the heart of this issue. 
The UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) – responsible for distributing a 
large proportion of UK social science research funding – includes as part of its definition of 
impact the idea of ‘fostering global economic performance, and specifically the economic 
competitiveness of the United Kingdom’ (ESRC 2014). The prioritization of the UK is 
unmistakable, but so is the foregrounding of ‘economic competitiveness’ and ‘performance’.  
The world of bounded states is also a world of capitalist economics. This has specific 
implications for discursive psychology: 
If I look towards the future, I do not dream of an expanded, technically improved 
discursive psychology, especially one that can prove its usefulness to a right-wing 
administration that is even more ideologically committed to making higher education 
entrepreneurial than was the Conservative administration of the late 1980s. 
(Billig 2012: 422-3) 
Billig’s contention is that some forms of discursive psychology have become 
conventionalized, and that where once there was radical critique, there is now a risk of 
political quietude. Rather than set up an academic island, separated from the social scientific 
mainland as experimental social psychology has done, Billig enjoins us to roam beyond the 
immediate confines of our increasingly small specialisms. Clearly, the conditions of present-
day academia militate against this, and this is why those conditions must themselves be 
subject to our critical gaze. In engaging critically with major currents in social theory and 
philosophy, Banal Nationalism shows not only that it is possible to venture outside of the 
confines of one’s own immediate academic specialism, but that it is vital to do so. If Banal 
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Nationalism constitutes one of the most compelling analyses of nationalism in recent times, 
in the critique of Rorty it also points the way to an analysis of the capitalist assumptions 
underpinning much of contemporary life. Only a few years after the near collapse of the 
capitalist system that has formed a central component of ‘the gradual spread of certain virtues 
typical to the democratic West’ (Rorty, cited in Billig 1995a: 172), it may be worth asking the 
question why the embedding of market values across a wide spectrum of systems and 
activities continues apace, and how the assumptions underpinning this process have come to 
be built into the fabric of reality, ‘as natural as rivers and mountain ranges’ (Billig 1995b: 
80). 
 
  
19 
 
References 
Abell, J. Condor, S., and Stevenson, C. (2006) ‘“We are an island”: Geographical imagery in 
accounts of citizenship, civil society, and national identity in Scotland and in 
England’, Political Psychology, 27: 207-226. 
Antaki, C. and Condor, S. (eds) (2014) Rhetoric, Ideology and Social Psychology: Essays in 
Honour of Michael Billig, Hove: Routledge. 
Billig, M. (1987) Arguing and Thinking:  A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology,  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Billig, M. (1991) Ideology and Opinions, London: Sage. 
Billig, M. (1993) ‘Nationalism and Richard Rorty: The text as a flag for Pax Americana’, 
New Left Review, I/202: 69-83. 
Billig, M. (1995a) Banal Nationalism, London: Sage. 
Billig, M. (1995b) ‘Rhetorical psychology, ideological thinking, and imagining nationhood’, 
in B. Klandermans and H. Johnston (eds) Social Movements and Culture, London: 
UCL Press. 
Billig, M. (1996) ‘Remembering the particular background of social identity theory’, in  
W. P. Robinson (ed.) Social Groups and Identities:  Developing the Legacy of Henri 
Tajfel, Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Billig, M. (1999) Freudian Repression:  Conversation Creating the Unconscious, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Billig, M. (2009) ‘Reflecting on a critical engagement with banal nationalism – reply to 
Skey’, The Sociological Review, 57: 347-352. 
Billig, M. (2012) ‘Undisciplined beginnings, academic success, and discursive psychology’, 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 51: 413-424. 
20 
 
Billig, M. (2013) Learn to Write Badly:  How to Succeed in the Social Sciences, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D. and Radley, A. (1988)  
Ideological Dilemmas:  A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking, London: Sage. 
Condor, S. (1996) ‘Unimagined community? Some social psychological issues concerning 
English national identity’, in G. Breakwell and E. Lyons (eds), Changing European 
Identities, London: Butterworth Heinemann. 
Condor, S. (2000) ‘Pride and prejudice: Identity management in English people's talk  
about ‘this country’’, Discourse & Society, 11: 175-205. 
Condor, S. (2006) ‘Temporality and collectivity: Diversity, history and the rhetorical 
construction of national entitativity’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 45: 657–
682. 
Condor, S. (2011) ‘Sense and sensibility: The conversational etiquette of English national 
self-identification’, in A. Aughey and C. Berberich (eds) These Englands: A 
Conversation on Identity, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Condor, S. and Abell, J. (2006) ‘Vernacular accounts of ‘national identity’ in post-devolution 
Scotland and England’, in J.Wilson and K. Stapleton (eds) Devolution and Identity, 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
ESRC (2014) What is Impact?  Available HTTP <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/funding-and-
guidance/impact-toolkit/what-how-and-why/what-is-research-impact.aspx> 
(accessed 5 June 2014). 
MacInnes, J., Rosie, M., Petersoo, P., Condor, S. and Kennedy, J. (2007) ‘Where is the 
British national press?’, The British Journal of Sociology, 58: 187-206. 
Reicher, S. (2011) ‘Promoting a culture of innovation: BJSP and the emergence of new 
paradigms in social psychology’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 50: 391-398. 
21 
 
Reicher, S. and Hopkins, N. (2001) Self and Nation, London: Sage. 
Reicher, S., Hopkins, N. and Condor, S. (1997) ‘The lost nation of psychology’, in C. C. 
Barfoot (ed.) Beyond Pug’s Tour: National and Ethnic Stereotyping in Theory and 
Literary Practice, Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Rorty, R. (1994) The unpatriotic academy. The New York Times, 13 February. Available 
HTTP: http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/13/opinion/the-unpatriotic-academy.html 
(accessed 6 June 2014). 
Rorty, R. (1998) Achieving our Country:  Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America , 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Rosie, M., MacInnes, J., Petersoo, P., Condor, S. and Kennedy, J. (2004) ‘Nation speaking 
unto nation? Newspapers and national identity in the devolved UK’, The 
Sociological Review, 52: 437-458. 
Rosie, M., Petersoo, P., MacInnes, J., Condor, S. and Kennedy, J. (2006) ‘Mediating which 
nation? Citizenship and national identities in the British press’, Social Semiotics, 16: 
327-344. 
Skey, M. (2009) ‘The national in everyday life: A critical engagement with Michael Billig’s 
thesis of Banal Nationalism’, The Sociological Review, 57: 331-346. 
Tajfel, H. (1960) ‘Nationalism in the modern world: The nation and the individual’, The 
Listener, 63, no. 1624: 846-847. 
Tajfel, H. (1970) ‘Aspects of national and ethnic loyalty’, Social Science Information, 9:  
119-144. 
 
                                                 
i
 To paraphrase Billig (2013: 155-6), we are all knob heads now. 
ii
 The scare quotes here are in acknowledgement of the problematically ‘national’ status of the UK (see the 
discussion of Condor’s work above). 
